The focus of the paper is on the potential of iron ore supplies from West and Central Africa to enter the export market over the short and medium terms and how this could impact the supply-side capacity and market price. To assess this, three export development scenarios (low, medium and high risk) are constructed for 17 iron ore mines (over 27 production expansion projects) in West and Central Africa. The projections for African iron ore are compared with the latest medium-term import forecasts and suggest that the development of West and Central African iron ore has the potential to create significant downward pressure on the price of iron ore exports over the medium term. The increased export capacity could push marginal producersmainly in China but also in India and elsewhere -out of the market.
Introduction
The price of iron ore has reached historically high levels in the past 5 years as exporters have been unable to expand production fast enough to keep pace with China's booming steel demand. This situation has drawn China's domestic iron ore producers into the market despite having operating costs estimated at three times those of the established international exporters.
Over the coming 5 years, China is expected to increase its demand for iron ore imports at a steady but slowing rate as it attempts to correct significant structural problems with its economy. Predictions of China's continuing growth have led to a recent push by major exporters, juniors and investors to explore, expand and develop iron ore resources in established and emerging regions.
The push to expand global export capacity and the willingness of Chinese investors and banks to provide funding to projects in high-risk areas, such as West and Central Africa, has created a scenario where export capacity could significantly outgrow demand at its current price in the next 5 years. This oversupply will have consequences for the profitability of the iron ore industry and for economies heavily invested in the current boom such as Australia and Brazil.
Understanding the potential for development of Africa's iron ore riches is of high importance to iron ore-rich countries such as Australia. For example, high prices and expanding iron ore production have been an important element in Australia's recent economic success, reflected in its historically high terms of trade. In 2011-2012, iron ore exports are forecast to increase by 2 per cent to A$59.7 billion, compared with (BREE 2012 . However, there is scant analysis of the potential of West and Central African iron ore to supply Chinese import demand, and how this could impact the industry worldwide or in Australia specifically.
This paper attempts to assess the current state of the iron ore market and predictions for the medium term, with a focus on the potential of West and Central African iron ore-rich countries. The paper is set out as follows: first, the medium-term forecasts are outlined for the major importers and exporters; next, the paper discusses the rising commercial prospects of several iron ore-rich countries in Africa and the important ties developed with Chinese partners; third, by constructing a risk index for mine and expansion projects, the paper forecasts the export potential of West and Central African iron ore-rich countries. Finally, the impact of Africa's expanding export potential on the iron ore price and profit margins is discussed. The paper concludes by outlining the key findings.
Background
The most important use of iron ore (up to 98 per cent) is as a primary input to steel production. There is no current substitute for iron ore in blast furnace steel production, and it takes approximately 1.6 tonnes of iron ore to produce one tonne of steel. Blast furnace production accounts for around 69.8 per cent of global steel production technology and 90.2 per cent of China's production (World Steel Association 2011).
Demand forecast
China is experiencing a period of unprecedented economic growth, which has put significant strain on the global iron ore industry to expand to keep pace with supply. When China joined the WTO in 2001 iron ore sold for around US$12.68/t. Since then, its rapid industrialisation, emerging middle class and urbanisation have contributed to unprecedented growth of demand of China's steel industry -this was the main driver for the export price reaching the historic high of US$187.18/t in February 2011 (see Figure 1) .
The Australian government's Bureau of Resource and Energy Economics (BREE) estimates that to satisfy the needs of its growing economy and the accompanying demands of its emerging middle class, continuing urbanisation and industrialisation, China's steel consumption will grow from 657 mt in 2012 to 812 mt in 2017 -accounting for 52.5 per cent of global expansion of steel consumption over this period (see Table 1 ) (BREE 2012) .
Despite large reserves, the average grade of China's iron ore is low (generally around 30 per cent ferric content), and reserves are predominantly located in the country's north and west, making transportation costly to steel mills, which are located mainly in industrialised coastal southern provinces (Drysdale and Hurst 2012) . The rise of China has outpaced the expansion of exporters, and China's marginal iron ore producers supplied an estimated 38.8 per cent of China's iron ore to its domestic steel mills in 2010.
China's marginal producers face costs of around US$120/t -around US $80/t more than established producers of high-grade (generally around 62 per cent) iron ore in Australia and Brazil -making imports a more reliable and Union  160  164  164  166  168  171  173  176  United States  90  94  96  98  101  104  107  110  Brazil  30  31  32  34  35  36  37  38  Russian Federation  42  44  45  47  48  50  52  53  China  600  624  657  695  729  761  787  812  Japan  68  69  74  77  78  80  81 cost-effective solution for China's steel industry (Trench 2004; Tse 2012 ). BREE's (2012) forecast indicates that iron ore exports to China will continue to grow at around 2.8 per cent per annum between 2012 and 2017 (a total increase of around 141 mt over the period) (see Table 2 ).
Supply response
BREE (2012) predicts that global demand for iron ore imports will increase by 425 mt from 2011 to 2017 (around the size of Australia's total iron ore exports in 2011) -of this increased demand, Chinese steel mills will account for around half (209 mt). Iron ore export expansion will be led by Australia's and Brazil's big four exporters (Vale, Rio Tinto, BHP Billiton and Fortescue) as Indian exports recede in face of the recently imposed 30 per cent iron ore export tariff and China's domestic iron ore producers face rising domestic inflation, continued exchange rate appreciation and decreasing international freight rates (UNCTAD 2011) (see Table 3 ).
2.2.1. India: domestic supply focus As Australian and Brazilian iron ore producers rush to meet rising demand from China, India is set to cut exports dramatically. In 2010, India was the world's third largest iron ore exporter, capturing around 9.1 per cent or 96 mt of the global export market (BREE 2012) .
In 2011, Indian authorities adopted policies to ensure their rapidly emerging middle class, and urban infrastructure needs would be supported by Indian steel production, in turn served by India's own iron ore riches. On 2 January 2012, the Indian government announced a further increase in export tariffs to iron ore lumps and fines of 30 per cent.
Unless the Federation of Indian Mineral Industries is able to have the tariffs repealed, exports for the first quarter of 2012 could be 75 per cent lower than that previously expected (BREE forecasts a drop in exports from 63 mt in 2011 to 43 mt in 2012) (Mukherjee and Dutta 2012) .
The gap left by receding Indian exports will put upward pressure on international prices in the short term and further support the case for rapid expansion of the export industry in Australia and Brazil (de Krester 2012). 
Australia: expansion plans and magnetite potential
Australian producers have developed significant expansion plans to capitalise on the rising demand from China and diminishing Indian exports. Currently, around US$60.8 billion of investments is planned for new iron ore mines and to expand current capacity, with another US$22 billion earmarked for infrastructure projects to support new capacity -these investments are scheduled to occur by 2018. The expansion plans are led by the three big Australian iron ore producers (BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto and Fortescue) as they attempt to push the total seaborne iron ore trade from 439 mt/a in 2011 to over 779 mt/a by 2017 (BREE 2012). High-grade haematite, or direct shipping ore (DSO), has driven Australia's iron ore boom to date. But the recent historically high prices and accompanying profit margins for iron ore have brought Australia's vast magnetite deposits into consideration in expansion plans (Game-Lopata 2012).
Australia currently has around 60 magnetite mines in planning or operational phases with total magnetite resources estimated at around 24.1bt (see Table 5 ). A report published by Deloitte Access Economics in 2011 estimated that development of the magnetite industry could add A$4.5 billion to national GDP per annum and create more than 4000 jobs (Burrell 2011) .
Just as Japan's development and engagement was critical to unlocking Australia's Pilbara haematite reserves in the 1960s, China is now well positioned to partner magnetite projects (Siddique 2011) . For example, Sino Iron's CITIC Pacific Magnetite Project is a significant step for the budding industry and is set to become the largest magnetite operation in the world; at full capacity, CITIC Pacific will mine around 140 mt per annum. But cost overruns and delays have resulted from a lack of understanding of Australia's policy environment more broadly -a key assumption underpinning the project was the cost savings CITIC hoped to gain from importing Chinese engineers and workers to build the mines. When standard Australian restrictions on imported labour were discovered by CITIC, the budget blew out significantly. As of 2011, Chinese investors have suspended all investments in magnetite projects in Western Australia (Hurst and Wang 2012) .
Brazil: expansion plans and cost reduction
Brazil is the second largest global iron ore exporter. Led by Vale, Brazil's exporters are investing quickly to take advantage of the high price of iron ore. BREE (2012) forecasts that iron ore exports from Brazil will reach 489 mt in 2017, up from 313 mt in 2011 (see Table 4 ).
Vale will invest US$10.2 billion by 2014 to expand its iron ore mine Caraj as Serra Sul. Caraj as, in the northern state of Par a, is the site of the company's single largest iron ore mine. Vale will also invest US$2.5 billion by 2014 in the Apolo iron ore mine project in Minas Gerais.
Australian producers hold a cost advantage over their Brazilian counterparts due to their geographic proximity to China. In December 2011, Capesize shipping rates from Port Hedland/Dampier to Qingdao are around US$13.50 per tonne (3 458 nautical miles), whereas Brazilian exporters faced transport costs of US$30.50 per tonne from Tubarão to Qingdao (11 023 nautical miles). Capesize ships from Australia take around 22 days 12 hours less time to reach Qingdao (based on 13 knot shipping speed) (see Figure 2 ). In an attempt to diminish the cost advantage of Australian producers, Vale has pursued an aggressive US$8 billion strategy to have 35 Valemax ships built. The Valemax ships can carry 380 000 to 400 000 deadweight tonnes (dwt) of iron ore each -more than twice the capacity of the current Capesize vessels, representing around US$1.6-2 million saving per shipment. The project has met significant obstacles, such as a cracked ballast tank in one ship and being turned away from Chinese ports, but it is too soon to accurately assert its success or failure.
West and Central Africa: the new iron ore frontier
Africa's total iron ore reserves (measured plus inferred) contain an estimated 34.9bt of haematite and 17.3bt of magnetite (see Appendix 1). In comparative terms, Africa has similar reserves to Australia, with 37.0bt of reported haematite reserves and 10.4bt of magnetite, although reserve levels provide a limited insight into production potential.
The forecast demand growth for iron ore from China and diminishing grades of haematite in Australia and Brazil, along with the uncertainty surrounding India's iron ore exports, have seen the focus shift to Africa's iron ore industry as low operating costs, and vast, high-grade discoveries of haematite have overshadowed countries' risk profiles.
The key driver for Africa's growth is not just China's booming resource import demand, but improved political and macroeconomic stability and microeconomic reforms. In the past decade, the real GDP of iron ore-rich African countries has enjoyed a healthy growth rate of 4.0 per cent (average GDP growth across Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Guinea, Liberia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Gabon) -the global average for the period was 3.9 per cent (McKinsey & Company 2010) .
The improved business environment has benefitted from government debt relief for the most highly indebted countries. Increased pledges of overseas development assistance from donor countries and philanthropic institutions are also providing fresh opportunities to free up resources for investment in human and fixed capital (Donnelly and Ford 2009) .
This growth and other political and macroeconomic indicators suggest that Africa may be at a turning point as a global resource supplier. Guinea's Bellzone and China International Fund joint venture operating company For ecariah Guinea Mining is an example of how high-risk operations in Africa's are becoming realistic investment opportunities. The project is set to begin exporting iron ore to China in the first quarter of 2012, on schedule (Esterhuizen 2012) .
The draw of Africa's iron ore is its relative purity. As ferrous content decreases in Australia and Brazil, unearthed African deposits consistently offer DSO quality resources. But for decades, the main obstacle to investing in African mining has been insufficient -often nonexistent -infrastructure. Deals that might have looked good on paper were often unviable once the infrastructure costs were factored into the internal rate of return. This situation means that the initial marginal cost for West and Central African iron ore will be massive when compared to the marginal costs of expanding production in Australia and Brazil where infrastructure is developed.
Sino-African cooperation
To develop African resources, Chinese operators have support from the US$5 billion China-Africa Development Fund (CADFund). The CADFund's stated aim is, 'Investing directly in Chinese enterprises which have set up operations in Africa or plan to invest in Africa, CADFund will push Chinese and African enterprises to reach their cooperation targets and facilitate infrastructure construction, as well as enhance the social and economic development of African countries'. The Fund provides equity and quasiequity investment, fund investment and investment management and consulting services for projects in agriculture, manufacturing, infrastructure, natural resources and industrial parks.
In addition to infrastructure development support, China's renewed investment push into global markets may hold the key for the development of African iron ore. RBC Capital Markets (2011) reports all-in capital costs to develop a sample of 32 iron ore mine sites across the African continent range between US$52 billion and US$54 billion. Current credit ratings for African iron ore countries (see Appendix 2), coupled with western banks' unwillingness to invest in such projects, suggest that it is unrealistic to expect these resources will develop in the next 5 to 10 years. An Australian mining CEO explained:
The difference is that the Chinese operators can get the funding from Chinese banks where the Western banks won't lend… So the Western company might make their assessment and go, 'Yeah, I want to buy', but can't get any funding for it and that's the difference. Moran et al. (2012) stated that 'Chinese investors will be more willing to take on new frontier -or even fringe -projects that the major established oil and mining companies might pass by'. Moran (2010) noted that in 13 of 16 cases analysed, Chinese investors took an equity stake and/or wrote long-term procurement contracts with producers on the competitive fringe.
Looking to the future, China has the necessary capital to assist the development of African iron ore export capacity in a way that will relieve supply pressure. China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) announced in early 2012 that over the next 5 years, it will encourage ODI to increase global stocks to US$560 billion (an increase of US$390 billion over the period). This push aims to make better use of China's estimated US$3.5 trillion of foreign exchange reserves at a time when exports markets are declining and FDI inflows slowing down as a result of the global economic crisis (Edwards 2012; Huang 2012) .
This future Chinese ODI is not all earmarked for African iron ore projects. But if 14 per cent of the $390 billion ODI is directed to African iron ore projects over the next 5 years, it would meet the $52-54 billion all-in capital costs reported by RBC Capital Markets to develop 32 mines across the continent.
It is essential for African governments to ensure a supportive business environment for these major capital intensive projects. Chinese banks are able to take a longer-term view of projects in comparison with western lenders, but the Chinese authorities are cracking down on risky investments in the wake of significant and embarrassing losses on international projects. China's State Assets Supervision and Administration Commission published new rules in 2012 that hold SOEs and their executives accountable for bad overseas investment decisions (Cai 2012) .
Low levels of knowledge capital have also been a considerable obstacle for the development of technology intensive infrastructure and mine sites. Again, China is a promising partner on this front. Unlike Australia, most of Africa's resource-rich countries allow Chinese operators to import a wider range of labour and management. Although this has created cases of significant tension and difficulties, it is a key ingredient for Africa's iron ore development, which had been previously lacking.
China's aim to secure iron ore supplies in Africa is supported by longestablished state relationships, fostered through its triennial Forum of ChinaAfrica Cooperation (FOCAC) (see Table 5 for FOCAC highlights).
Strong state ties provide some assurance and political insurance for Chinese investment in iron ore. China's noninterventionist approach to international engagement also permits relationships with regimes where western governments would be unwilling (Hurst 2010) .
Supply potential
Already there are hundreds of iron ore projects under study or being developed in Africa, with governments pushing to increase their iron ore export capacity, while the price is high. For example, the Guinean government has pressured Rio Tinto to truck iron ore 650 km to meet its first ore shipment deadline of mid-2013 from its Simandou mine.
Method
The author collected data for 27 mine and expansion projects, which are planned across West and Central African. Each project was assessed for risk using a seven-factor risk index to construct three risk-based scenarios -high, medium and low-risk. Risk was calculated by considering data from a number of sources (such as company reports, Intierra database and news articles) on host operational risk, host political risk, project infrastructure requirements, investor experience, investor-government relations, funding risks and Chinese ownership and funding. Each project received a numerical overall score for risk based on the unweighted aggregated scores for the seven risk categories and assigned an overall risk rating of high, medium or low risk based on the overall score.
Another way of looking at these risk scenarios is to think of low-risk projects as having a high probability of coming on stream as designed and within the time frame planned; medium-and high-risk expansion phases have a lower probability of meeting their outlined initial production dates, being more likely to be delayed. The likelihood of these higher-risk projects coming online in the long-term is nonetheless real, and they represent a significant longer-term overhang in the market (see Appendix 3 for list of mine and expansion projects).
Results
Based on the reporting of 17 mines (more than 27 production expansion phases), West and Central African iron ore production has the potential, in the high-risk scenario, to add 481 mt/a to world iron ore export capacity by 2018 (see Figure 3 and Table 7 ). This figure is in line with estimates by RBC Capital Markets (2011) that 475-575 mt/a of iron ore export capacity will become available in Africa by 2016 (based on analysis of 32 mines), and by Ocean Ocean Equities (2011) that 300 mt/a could be available by 2018 (based on 16 mines).
The low-risk scenario suggests that if all high-and medium-risk projects are delayed beyond 2018, 31 mt/a (in addition to the 425 mt of already forecast global export supply expansion) will come online by 2018 -representing a global export supply overcapacity of 2 per cent. If all medium-and low-risk projects are successful and high-risk projects delayed, 166 mt/a export capacity could come online -representing 10.6 per cent export overcapacity by 2018. If all 27 analysed mine and expansion projects come online as planned, an extra 422 mt/a would be available to the global export market by 2018. This increase would see export capacity 27 per cent greater than forecast global demand by 2008 (see Figures 3 and 4 , and Tables 6 and 7) .
Most disclosed estimates of operating costs for West and Central African iron ore projects tend to be relatively low due to low labour costs and the high-grade ore, which requires little processing. African free on board (fob) cost estimates range from as low as US$20/t for the planned DSO material from Sundance's Mbalam project up to US$50/t for Sierra Leone's Marampa mine (RBC Capital Markets 2011; Emery 2012) . When shipping costs are included, West and Central African iron ore will, on average, cost around A$50-80/t cif into China. Marginal cost for African projects will be much higher and has been accounted for in the risk index, which considers factors such as project infrastructure requirements.
In a business as usual scenario, BREE (2012) estimated that the contract price of iron ore will average around A$140/t in 2012 and will drop to A$109/ t by 2017.
In the low-risk scenario, the addition of BREE's forecast global expansion and African export capacity could decrease the price to A$80/t cost, insurance and freight (cif) into China by 2018; the medium-risk scenario could see the price drop to around A$65/t, and the high-risk scenario, to around A$60/t (see Figures 5 and 6 ). In the low-risk scenario, West and Central African iron ore will push current marginal suppliers -mainly Chinese but also Indian and others -out of the market. If the high-risk scenario is realised some of the new higher cost, African capacity will also be pushed out.
If the iron ore price dropped to A$80/t cif into China, low-cost exporters such as Rio Tinto, BHP Billiton and Vale would still have a A$35-45/t margin. If the high-or medium-risk scenarios materialised, these operating margins could drop to around A$25-30/t.
Conclusion
The forecast growth of China's iron ore imports and India's focus on supplying its domestic steel industry over the medium term has led miners and investors to aggressively pursue exploration, expansion and development of Australian and Brazilian resources. But there has been a recent trend to look further afield to countries traditionally considered too risky.
Countries in West and Central Africa have vast and high-quality iron ore reserves, but development of these resources requires massive capital infrastructure investment in operationally risky environments. Western banks are extremely hesitant to lend, and the scarcity of capital has been a large impediment to development.
China, on the other hand, has an estimated US$3.5 trillion in foreign exchange reserves, and state authorities have stated they will support US$390 billion in overseas direct investments over the next 5 years -much of which will target strategic resources such as iron ore.
China has also capitalised on its noninterference approach to international engagement and established state ties with several of Africa's iron ore-rich nations. This state-level engagement provides assurance to China's mainly state-owned investors and banks when making large capital investments in operationally risky projects. But in the light of recent overseas investment failures, Chinese authorities are requiring more rigour in due diligence, and African governments will be required to ensure their investment environment is supportive of the major capital projects required.
The push to expand iron ore export capacity in Africa along with African governments' pressure to get iron ore to market while the price is high has created significant risk of export overcapacity in the medium term. If all the iron ore projects analysed came online as reported, by 2018 an additional 481 mt/a will be available to the global export market -representing 27 per cent overcapacity in global exports. This could lead the price of iron ore to drop to around A$60/t cif to China in the high-risk scenario -the price could fall to around A$65/t in the medium and A$80/t in the low-risk scenarios.
A price decrease to A$80/t would still provide intra-marginal producers like Rio Tinto and Vale with considerable yet highly impacted operating margins of around A$35-45/t -instead of current margins of over A$80/t. But the price decrease would push out marginal producers -especially in China but also in India and elsewhere.
This research provides a preliminary analysis of the potential for emerging iron ore-rich countries in Africa to build export capacity over the medium term and how that could impact the global market. Further research is required on the industrial organisation of the global iron ore market and analysis on how rents are shared between buyers and sellers; this will require careful analysis of the organisation and influence of the state in the Chinese steel market. Finally, there is value in developing a general or partial equilibrium framework to better understand the supply and demand variables influencing the iron ore market to establish long-run trends. †'Other' refers to a mine with a status other than operational, that is, advanced exploration, construction, exploration, feasibility study, grass roots, prefeasibility/scoping and unknown.
